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In addition, we were reminded forcefully and eloquently of the
deeper cancer of society: the injustice in the total system working
to the constant disadvantage of minorities, and which c,onsequently causes our legal and judicial institutions to lose legitimacy for
these groups. The raising of these larger questions might well
cause us to wonder whether perhaps, to quote Senator Sam Ervin,
we "have caught the wrong sow by the ear" in placing emphasis on
a preventive detention bill as a partial solution to the problem of
crime.
We would like to express our appreciation to the participants in
this conference whose remarks are the substance of this book. In
addition, we acknowledge gratefully the work of Lucy Ann Marx,
who put the conference together; Sue Cullen, who edited the
material; and Eunice Schatz, who has held everything together
since.
John Naisbitt
President
Urban Research Corporation
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program, farm subsidies, oil depletion allowances,
and al1 the rest. I'd rather give them up, and then
we can pay for the alternatives like speedy trials
and maintain the principle of liberty.
If you review history (and at one time in 1ny
career I did a sociology of revolutions at this
university), I think you will find that vulnerable
and unattractive groups are usually the occasion
for making inroads on the tradition of liberties.
Today that vulnerable and unattractive group is
the presumed dangerous offender and the drug
addict. Tomorrow, who knows who it will be?
Anyone who is present at a riot scene is apt to
look vulnerable and unattractive. In the fear and
panic of the response to a riot our courts are
already resorting to preventive detention under
cover of law. I am speaking of prohibitively high
bail. Should we give them the substance of law as
well? Well, I'll listen to the proponents of preventive detention, but I'll be awfully hard to convince. So now you know at least where I stand
quite clearly, and I make no pretense about it.

administration of
justice during
riots

"extra" period
of pretrial
detention found

JEROLD H. ISRAEL [Professor of Law, University of Michigan]: Various studies of the administration of justice during riots establish that persons arrested during riots generally have been
detained for substantially longer periods than
persons arrested during nonriot situations. This
"extra" period of pretrial detention has been the
product of quite different practices in different
cities, and these practices have been based on
several different administrative policies including,
but not limited to, preventive detention.
In several cities, extra-lengthy detention resulted from a general judicial policy of setting extraordinarily high bail for the duration of the riot.
A prime example was Detroit, where 70% of the
bail initially set was in excess of $5,000, and few
people gained their release until the judges reexamined their bail decisions and began to release
persons on their own recognizance after the disorder had substantially subsided.
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Other cities required somewhat lower bonds,
but at amounts still extraordinary in light of
nonriot practices. In Baltimore, for example,
bonds for curfew violators were originally set at
$500. Although available evidence indicates that
these high bonds were set for the very purpose of
preventing persons from obtaining their release,
courts were not always concerned primarily with
preventive detention-that is, detaining persons
because of the fear that they would return to the
streets and commit crimes following their release.
Very frequently, the judges indicated a desire to
use pretrial detention in a basically punitive fashion. Judges in several cities suggested that a
policy of high bail (in effect, a policy of nonrelease) would tend to deter other persons from
violating the law. They felt that the "word"
would get around-"if you are arrested, you will
automatically spend a few days in jail under very
uncomfortable circumstances, so you had better
play it safe and stay off of the streets."
In a few cities, extra-lengthy detention was
probably an unintended product of following
normal bail practices. Judges in these cities set
bail at normal levels, but bondsmen were simply
unavailable or unwilling to write bonds until
matters "cooled off." As a result, many persons
arrested in these communities often stayed in jail
almost as long as persons arrested in communities
following high bail policy.
In other areas, extra-lengthy detenti9n was as
much the product of administrative difficulties at
the police and prosecutor level as any judicial
policy. In Detroit, the prosecutor sought to
check the record of each arrested person before
any individual bail recommendation would be
made. Under this approach, even if local courts
were willing to release arrested persons on their
own recognizance where they were charged with a
minor offense and had a "good" record, those
persons might be detained two or three days
-before their police and employment record could
be checked and such information could be conveyed to the court.
195
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control of bail
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riots
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limited preventive
detention during
riots

will persons
arrested during
riots commit
crimes upon
being released?

Extra-detention based on administrative difficulties or the punitive use of high bail raises
numerous problems that are worthy of treatment
in a separate conference on that subject alone.
Our primary concern here is with preventive
detention, and I mention detention based on
these other grounds only to put our problem in
its proper perspective, and to indicate the need
for extensive control of bail practices during riots
irrespective of one's position on preventive detention.
With respect to preventive detention, I hope to
make a single point; even if one assumes that
preventive detention in the normal situation is
both unwise and unconstitutional, it does not
necessarily follow that preventive detention
should also be rejected in the riot situation. The
pragmatic and legal considerations relating to
preventive detention during riots are sufficiently
different so that a quite distinct, and perhaps
stronger, case can be made for at least limited
preventive detention during such disorders.
Let me start by noting some of the pragmatic
considerations. First, how likely is it that persons
arrested during riots will commit crimes upon
being released? The available statistics are rather
limited, but they suggest that the likelihood is not
very great. The rate of rearrest in Washington, for
example, was 3.1 % for all persons arrested during
the dvil disturbance, 2.9% for persons arrested
for noncurfew offenses. Admittedly, such -statistics arc open to attack on several grounds. The
rate of rearrest, of course, may not indicate the
rate of recidivism. Also, the available statistics
were all based on release programs that were
substantially more restrictive than those applied
in normal situations. In Washington, for example,
although 42.7% of noncurfew arrestees were released on their own recognizance, the court
accepted the D.C. Bail Agency recommendation
for release under non financial conditions in 25 to
30% fewer cases than in normal times. There are

196

,I

proposals for

I imited preventive
detention system

examined

other factors, however, that tend to support the
implications of the Washington statistics. In
many jurisdictions, almost half of the persons
arrested had no criminal record. It seems unlikely
that those persons, having undergone the traumatic experience of arrest, detention, and initial
presentment before a magistrate, would immediately return to the streets and engage in criminal
activities. The same would also be true, in large
part, for the 20 to 40% who had a record of only
petty misdemeanor offenses.
In sum, the present evidence on recurring
offens es by persons arrested during riots is not as
complete as we might hope; but, if one starts with
the assumption that preventive detention is an
extraordinary measure that should only be
adopted upon a strong showing of need-as I
do-the current evidence provides a quite sufficient basis for opposing present adoption of a
general program of preventive detention.
Very few people, however, have seriously urged
wholesale preventive detention of all persons
arrested during riots. Several prosecutors, speaking during the height of the riot, have made
statements that might support such a position,
but further explanation (or reassessment) has
usually revealed a position advocating limited
preventive detention-for example, detention of
persons arrested on more serious charges, such as
arson, or inciting to riot, and persons with substantial records who have been charged with
breaking and entering.
Similar proposals, although somewhat more
limited, have been advanced by several commentators who are much farther removed from the
heat of the battle. Probably the most detailed
proposal of this type is that advanced by Calista
and Domonkos in the Journal of Urban Law [ 45
J. Urban Law 815, 1968]. They suggest a limited
preventive detention system which would go into
effect upon the declaration of an emergency
(involving an actual and continuing disorder) by
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the governor. Preventive detention for the duration of the disorder could then be ordered by a
court, after an individual hearing, for persons who
have been charged with incitement to riot or
some crime involving the threat of safety to
others, or who have a criminal record evidencing
"violent or destructive anti-social behavior." All
other persons would be entitled to "reasonable
bail" based upon an individual determination.
This restriction supposedly would prevent the
courts fro1n seeking to impose a general preventive detention upon all arrested persons by simply
setting bail at a point where it cannot be made.
A limited preventive detention proposal along
the lines suggested by Colista and Domonkos
certainly could find far greater support than the
general detention of all persons arrested during a
riot. Yet, is there a sufficient showing of need
with respect to even those persons that fall within
the categories suggested by Calista and Domonkos?
Statistics concerning the response of such persons to release are simply unavailable because
those persons generally have not been released.
In Detroit, for example, bail for persons charged
with arson or incitement to riot exceeded
$25,000. (A bond for an alleged sniper was set at
$200,000.) It has been suggested that persons
who engage in acts like incitement to riot or arson
are not "spur-of-the-moment" criminals, but persons who are highly antagonistic toward society
and therefore very likely repeaters. Others argue,
however, that this will depend largely on the
individual case and is often difficult to determine
even when the evaluation is based on considerable
background information besides the grounds for
arrest. They also stress that, in several judisdictions, many of the persons charged with very
serious offenses have either been acquitted or
convicted of lesser offenses. In Detroit, for
example, 22 out of 28 prosecutions for incitement to riot and 21 out of 34 prosecutions for
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arson were dismissed. They suggest that in terms
of predicting future criminality, the Administration's bill provides for a much more reliable
procedure, and, if that procedure is not sufficiently reliable to justify preventive detention in normal times, an even less reliable procedure should
not be accepted in riot legislation.
Proponents of limited preventive detention
might offer several points in reply to this position
(assuming arguendo that the Administration's
proposal has been rejected as unsatisfactory).
First, one might contend that an ongoing riot
poses such a severe threat to society that it
requires taking greater risks in terms of predicting
potential criminality than we would be willing to
take during normal periods. This would be
especially true where the individuals involved are
charged with offenses that tend to promote and
lend renewed vigor to a riot-such as incitement
to riot, arson or sniping. It could also be suggested that many of the points made against
preventive detention in normal situations are not
as well taken as applied to the riot situation.
One argument advanced against preventive
detention generally is that a person detained in
prison cannot prepare his case and therefore will
be at a disadvantage in presenting his defense at
trial. Preventive detention during riots, however,
will not last longer than the period of the riot,
and one could rarely go out and prepare his
defense (locating witnesses, etc.) even if he were
released during that period.
The suggestion is made also that preventive
detention during normal periods is not necessary
because we have alternative devices such as thirdparty custody, peace bonds, and part-time release. These alternatives are largely nonexistent
during a disorder. Third parties can't be found,
peace bonds are impossible to enforce, and jails
are too crowded and personnel too busy with
other matters to start releasing people during the
day and bringing them back at night.
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of limited
preventive
detention

In sum, I suggest that one could welJ argue that
even though preventive detention is not justified
during normal times, a limited system of preventive detention, such as that suggested by Colista
and Don1onkos, could be justified on the grounds
that ( l) there is greater need for preventive
detention during riots because the riot situation
presents a greater threat to society, (2) the period
of detention, lasting the duration of the riot, is
shorter and less costly to the individual, and (3)
alternative devices for preventing potential repetition of serious offenses are not available.
On the other hand, one must acknowledge
preventive detention during a riot does have its
own special drawbacks as compared to preventive
detention during normal periods. As I have already noted, proposals for limited preventive
detention during riots may caJl for individual
determinations of the need for detention, but the
pressure of time will make such determinations
much Jess complete and potentially inaccurate
than the hearings required, for example, under
the Administration's biJL Also if preventive
detention is dehumanizing during normal periods,
it must be doubly so during the riot when jails are
likely to be extremely overcrowded and persons
may be detained, at ]east temporarily, in most
inadequate facilities.
These then are some of the basic factors that
must be considered in determining whether
limited preventive detention is justified. As for
the constitutionality of such a proposal, I believe
that the current state of precedent and doctrine is
sufficiently fluid so that these factors wi11 likely
be controlling on that score also.
In analyzing the constitutional issue, let us
assume arguendo that the Eighth Amendment
grants an absolute right to bail in all noncapital
cases and that bail must be set with regard only to
the individual's likelihood of appearance at trial.
Does it necessarily follow that preventive detention during riots is invalid? I think not. There
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are at least two and possibly three lines of related
precedent which might justify bypassing the
assumed Eighth Amendment right to bail during a
riot.
The first line of authority is a series of cases, at
the state and federal level, interpreting the scope
of martial law. Before analyzin$ the more relevant martial law cases, it is necessary to draw
some distinctions between types of problems that
have been presented in such cases. First, we
should distinguish those cases involving complete
martial law-that is, martial rule during a period
of actual or immediately pending invasion. Those
cases most clearly recognize that martial law can
override normally applicable constitutional rights,
but also stress that the exercise of total martial
law must be clearly justified. This would not be
the case in the typical riot situation. The courts
and legislature would not be inoperative, and
there would be no justification for their replacement by the military.
At the most, the typical riot may require the
imposition of so-called qualified martial law,
where the n1ilitary takes over the law enforcement function only, and all prosecutions still are
brought in the civil courts. At times, appellate
courts have spoken in extremely broad terms of
the scope of qualified martial law. Most of these
opinions, however, mean very little as applied to
the preventive detention problem. They were
concerned with attacks on martial law that did
not involve the suspension of individual rights;
rather the major objection presented usually was
based on the exercise of executive power
(through martial law) to impose economic restrictions that had not been approved by the legislature (arthough the restrictions were clearly within
the general scope of government power).
There are several decisions, however, that do
deal with the suspension of individual rights.
Most of these cases arose out of labor violence
during the l 920's and l 930's and a few upheld
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preventive detentjon. Probably the most significant is the United States Supreme Court decision
in Moyer v. Peabody in 1909. Moyer arose out of
martial rule imposed in areas of Colorado fallowing the outbreak of violence in connection with a
bitter labor dispute.
The governor, after determining that Moyer, a
labor leader, "had been, and ... would continue
to be an active participant in fomenting and
keeping alive the condition of insurrection,"
ordered that he be arrested by the military and
detained without trial "during the ... continuing
condition of affairs" in the area. Although the
courts apparently were operating at the time and
Moyer petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, his
application was denied. After his release by the
military authorities, he brought suit for damages
against the governor, alleging that he had been
deprived of liberty without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court, in an unanimous opinion, affirmed the dismissal of his
action. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court,
noted that, since the executive could direct the
military to restore order even by killing those that
resisted, he certainly could use the milder measure of "seizing the bodies" of those whom he
considered likely to stand in the way of restoring
order.
I have always had some difficulty with Holmes'
logic. On the firing-line, the executive must of
necessity make a prompt decision, without any
form of hearing, as to whether deadly force is
needed to repel a person who is forcibly resisting
law enforcement; but I have difficulty understanding why this justifies arrest of a person who
may cause trouble in the future, and, even so,
why the executive's decision on that point should
automatically be accepted by the judiciary. In
any event, Moyer is somewhat suspect today if
for no other reason than its date of decision and
the subsequent development of a more sympathetic approach, at least in the Supreme Court, to
202

Korematsu case

the rights of the individual. (It should be noted,
however, that Frederick Bernays Wiener suggested
in a recent article in the ABA Journal that Moyer
was still quite reasonable authority.
Perhaps a more promising source for sustaining
a limited preventive detention program is
Korematsu v. United States. IR Korematsu, the
Supreme Court upheld an important aspect of the
Japanese relocation program of World War II as a
proper exercise of military power. lt should be
recalled that this program did not simply involve
relocation; many of the people moved were originally kept in detention camps. Also, the individuals involved initially were not given an individualized hearing to determine their loyalty to the
country. Because some Japanese might be disloyal, all Japanese were excluded from their West
Coast homes and a substantial number were put
in these camps and kept there till they could be
relocated.
In many respects, the restraint
imposed was far more severe than that involved in
a limited preventive detention program during a
riot.
In Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld the
order excluding persons of Japanese ancestry
from the West Coast area. Although the Court
found it unnecessary to consider the validity of
the detention camp program, various statements
in the majority opinion might well have been
extended to justify at least the initial detention of
excluded persons as a necessary means of implementing the exclusion order. Moreover, the
majority opinion in Korematsu was written by
Justice Black and was joined by Justice Douglastwo Justices renowned as defenders of individual
liberties. (Interestingly, the dissenters included
two Justices, Roberts and Jackson, who have
generally been viewed as somewhat less sympathetic to the protection of individual rights.)
Still another line of authority that might support limited preventive detention is derived from
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constitutional
provisions authorizing
suspension of writ
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the constitutional provisions-both state and fed-·
eral-authorizing suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus under limited circumstances. I have considerable difficulty in replying upon such authority, however, because: (1) I doubt that a riot
will meet the conditions specified for suspending
the writ-for example, the "rebellion" requirement of the federal constitution; and (2) suspension of the writ, which admittedly is the basic
procedural remedy for contesting illegal detention, does not in itself justify detention-that is,
elimination of the remedy does not necessarily
eliminate the right.
I do feel, however, that cases like Moyer and
Korematsu afford ample precedent for supporting
limited preventive detention if it can be justified
in light of the policy factors I mentioned earlier.
For myself, if I were presented with a statute that
authorized preventive detention along the lines
suggested by Colista and Domonkos, but also
abolished all money bond requirements for release of curfew violators, misdemeanants, and
felons not subject to preventive detention and
required their prompt presentment for release, I
would support that bill as a reasonable approach
that would result in the unnecessary detention of
far fewer persons than current practices.

RICHARD BUXBAUM [Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley] : My teaching and
writing specialties are corporation law and antitrust, and only peripherally involvement in
student activities. I was not sure just what I was
supposed to do here. But listening to the challenge put by Mrs. Wald to Mr. Santarelli that if
the problem was one of people committing crimes
during an extensive period out on bail, why didn't
we face first the issue of trying to obtain fast
expedited trials before we go all the way to
preventive detention, l' suddenly realized the
value of corporation law here too. We have the
problem of the security-for-expense provision in
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